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This paper analyzes the relationship between age and health services utilization
in Chile, using the CASEN survey of 1994. Logistic analysis is performed to determine
how age utilization profiles differ by income, location and system affiliation (private or
public insurance).  The results are used to discuss the consequences of population aging
on the health system, detect problems and suggest possible solutions.
In Chile, older persons have both a higher probability of being ill, and a higher
probability of seeking care if they are ill.  Expected utilization is more than three times
higher for older persons than for persons 18-34 years old.  Most old people currently are
affiliates of the public health system.  Hence the aging of the population could be
expected to be mainly a problem for the public sector.  However, this would be so only if
the pricing system of both the private and public insurance systems is not reformed.
Moreover, without such a change, a large injection of funds into the public sector could
result in an unexpected shift of affiliates from the public and into the private sector,
generating under capacity in the public sector and over capacity in the private sector.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the relationship between age and health services utilization in
Chile, using the CASEN survey of 1994.
Logistic analysis is performed to determine how the age utilization profiles differ by
income, location and system affiliation.
The results are used to discuss the consequences of population aging on the health
system, detect possible problems and suggest solutions to these problems.2 CHILE:  EFFECTS OF OLD AGE ON HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION
II. MOTIVATION
The Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE) projects a substantial increase
in the population 65 years or older: it will increase from 6.1% of the total population in
1990 to 11% in 2020 and to approximately 20% by 2050. This implies a shift in demand
from younger to older persons; i.e. to population that makes more use of the health
system (that both spends more and uses more services).  At issue is whether the Chilean
system can adapt to such an increase.
The key to the institutional consequences of this problem is the different pricing
systems.
Fonasa charges 7% of wages and ISAPREs charge according to risk (age, sex and
number of dependent family members), for a given income, once risk raises above a
certain threshold, it is convenient to shift from ISAPREs to Fonasa (a person that does
this should take, of course, into account the lower quality of care received in Fonasa).
This in effect sorts the population according to income and risk, and makes Fonasa more
attractive to the poor and high risk population.
The concentration of the poor and risky in  Fonasa can be explained by the rational
choice of affiliates, given the constraints they face (Sapelli and Torche 1998).
First, for a given risk level, those relatively poor will find the ISAPRE system
expensive and the rich will find it cheaper.  Second, for a given income level, those with
a high risk will find the FONASA system relatively cheap and the ISAPRE system
expensive. This is explained below:
i) As income increases, the premium one has to pay for the package offered by the
public system increases. Since the risk of the person has not changed, the
expected expenditure has not changed either, implying a higher price for
insurance. In the private system, when income increases and the mandated
premium increases, one is offered a better plan by the ISAPREs. The price paid
does not change.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 255 3
ii) As health status (or risk) worsens, FONASA continues to charge only the
mandated 7% of income. Since expected expenditure rises, this implies that the
price of public insurance falls.  However, the ISAPREs will increase the premium
(with limits) when expected expenditures increase.  Hence the insured has to opt
between spending more than their 7% or decreasing coverage. Price remains the
same.
These two aspects explain why the persons with the most risk and the least










From this we can conclude that, even if older persons in the private sector do not
face a financial constraint that makes it necessary for them to move to Fonasa once they
reach old age, the different pricing systems may be a strong enough incentive to make
older people chose Fonasa.
Sapelli and Vial (98) perform a study that is principally oriented to identifying
differences in utilization according to income (and that concludes that there are no
systematic differences in utilization by income, except for the fifth quintile that utilizes
30% more services). The lack of a relationship between utilization and income implies
that we should not expect much difference in utilization by age in the public and private
systems or much difference in utilization by age according to income.4 CHILE:  EFFECTS OF OLD AGE ON HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
One third of those 71 or older claimed having suffered an illness or an accident
during the past three months.  This is up from one quarter in persons 60-70 and less than
one fifth in persons 45-59. However, due to the size of the age cohorts, of the total
number of persons who declare themselves to have suffered an illness or accident,
persons 71 and older are only 13% (and persons 60 and older are not more than one
third).
The percentage of persons demanding at least one service is higher in every age
bracket than those that are ill, but the percentage increase is higher for those 71 and
older.  In effect, about one half of those 71 and older demand at least one service.
Average imputed expenditure.
Due to the structure of demands, average expenditure for those that demand at
least one service does not differ much by age (it is only 10% higher for those 71 and
older than for those 18-34 years old). However, since the probability of demanding at
least one service differs sharply by age, probable expenditure increases sharply by age,
from 8.9 for those 18-34 to 30.2 for those 71 and older (the progression is: 8.9; 11.5;
15.9; 25.6 and 30.2).
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Methodology
Estimated probits for the probability of being sick, of seeking care, of seeking
different types of care, and of having to pay at least something out of pocket.
Variables used to explain these probabilities are: age bracket,  income  quintile,
genre, family status and location.  All are dummy variables.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 255 5
An OLS regression is performed with the same independent variables to explain
utilization valued at private sector prices.  We use private sector prices since what is
really important in the  construction of  these  indexes are  the  relative  prices and  we
assume that private sector relative prices are more approximate to real resource use by
service.
Results
Determinants of the probability of being sick:
Increases with: age, marriage, being a woman,
No relationship with: income
Decreases with: living in Santiago
Persons that are sick can either seek care or not.
Determinants of the probability of seeking care if sick:
Increases with: age, income, marriage, women, urban location
Hence old people are not only more likely to become sick, but also if they do, it is
more probable that they will seek help.
Persons who seek care can see a doctor, require a hospital stay, exams or surgery.
Determinants of the probability of seeing a doctor given that one is ill and seeks care:
The older you are, the more likely you will seek a doctor.  People in the rural
areas also are more likely to seek a doctor.
Determinants of the probability of a hospital stay if ill and seek care:
It is less likely that you will stay at the hospital if you are old, rich, or a woman.
Poor people are more likely to have a hospital stay.
Young people are more likely to have a hospital stay.
This result may sound strange, however, it is due to the fact that if young
people seek care it is likely to be because of an accident and hence much more
probable that it will require either surgery or a hospital stay. As shown above6 CHILE:  EFFECTS OF OLD AGE ON HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION
(see table), in the whole population, the percentage of persons of old age
having a hospital stay or surgery is higher (three times higher) than for the
other age groups.  That is, the unconditional probability of requiring surgery is
higher for older persons; however, the probability conditional on being
ill/having an accident and seeking care is higher for younger people.
Determinants of the probability of paying something if ill and seek care:
It is more probable that care is free if you are old, poor or in the rural areas (not
by chance it is where Fonasa affiliates are).
Finally we run an OLS regression between an index of utilization and the same
independent variables as the previous analysis.
We find that utilization is unrelated to income (such as in Sapelli and Vial) and
that the only major influence on utilization is age.
Remember we are talking here of a sub-sample of the population, those that were sick in
the last 3 months and sought care, and not the population as a whole.
Old people are more likely to be sick and more likely to seek care if sick.
However, the care they seek is that which is cheaper (doctors and exams).  Since
younger people are more likely to face surgery or hospitalization, then that makes total
cost of utilization more similar among age groups.
We performed the same probit analysis to try and detect different patterns of
utilization in the private and public sectors.  For this we include in the  probits an
interaction variable between age bracket and system.  IF this variable turns out to be
significant it would be evidence that different age brackets are treated differently in the
two systems.
We will concentrate only on the significance and signs of the new interaction
variable.
Only 10 of the 32 variables we added turned to be significant.  Persons in the
ISAPREs system tend to fall sick less often (this is particularly true for those 60 orDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 255 7
older). This shows that those with the highest risk are effectively choosing Fonasa, as
argued above.  However, once they are ill, the probability of seeking care does not differ
between persons in ISAPREs or Fonasa.
The other interesting result is for the probability of paying something out of
pocket. This probability declines with age in Fonasa (controlling for income).  In the
ISAPREs system the probability is greater for those 35 and older, than for those 35 or
less. However, for those 35 and older the probability declines with age.
The figures show that the probability of seeking some service increases sharply
with age, but that this probability does not differ much by income or location.  The
probability is about 10% higher (1 to 2 percentage points higher) for the richest quintile
than for the rest of the population. Moreover, the probability of seeking care is slightly
higher in the rural areas than in the Greater Santiago, independently of age or income.
One interesting conclusion from the probit explaining who seek help within the
whole population is that the probability of seeking help increases sharply with age. In
particular, the probability of seeking help increases more sharply with age for those not
ill, than for those that are ill.8 CHILE:  EFFECTS OF OLD AGE ON HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION

















































































Quintil 1 Quintil 2 Quintil 3 Quintil 4 Quintil 5DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 255 9




















Older persons have a higher probability of being ill and a higher probability of
seeking care if they are ill.  Expected utilization is more than three times higher for older
persons than for persons 18-34.  Most old people currently are affiliates of the public
health system.  Hence the aging of the population could be expected to be mainly a
problem in the public sector.  This would imply the need for adjusting infrastructure,
etc..
However, as is discussed in the text, this would be the way if the pricing systems
of both systems are not reformed.  Where they to be changed, and the system of Fonasa
made similar to that in Isapres (possibly together with subsidies), then the private sector
could handle a substantial portion of the problem, making it more manageable, since the
private sector usually can make investment decisions quickly and is much more
adaptable.10 CHILE:  EFFECTS OF OLD AGE ON HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION
A large injection of funds into the public sector could result in an unexpected
shift of affiliates from the private and into the public sector, generating under capacity in
the public sector and over capacity in the private sector (since currently Fonasa cannot























































18 - 34 5.435 7.673 6.808 649 2.427 270 15.233 13.864 9.269 8.983 49.805 57.648
35 - 44 3.123 4.134 3.778 281 1.240 159 8.173 7.340 4.499 4.377 23.179 64.446
45 - 59 4.375 6.180 5.785 406 1.840 192 8.916 7.467 3.588 3.450 23.266 59.858
60 - 70 3.065 4.458 4.274 273 1.262 150 5.649 4.365 714 683 12.086 69.615
71 - > 2.427 3.582 3.457 249 890 84 3.603 2.495 174 164 7.535 63.461
TOTAL 18.425 26.027 24.102 1.858 7.659 855 41.574 35.531 18.244 17.657 115.871 62.102
Percentages of the total population (% by row)
18 - 34 10,91% 15,41% 13,67% 1,30% 4,87% 0,54% 30,59% 27,84% 18,61% 18,04% 100,00%
35 - 44 13,47% 17,84% 16,30% 1,21% 5,35% 0,69% 35,26% 31,67% 19,41% 18,88% 100,00%
45 - 59 18,80% 26,56% 24,86% 1,75% 7,91% 0,83% 38,32% 32,09% 15,42% 14,83% 100,00%
60 - 70 25,36% 36,89% 35,36% 2,26% 10,44% 1,24% 46,74% 36,12% 5,91% 5,65% 100,00%
71 - > 32,21% 47,54% 45,88% 3,30% 11,81% 1,11% 47,82% 33,11% 2,31% 2,18% 100,00%
TOTAL 15,90% 22,46% 20,80% 1,60% 6,61% 0,74% 35,88% 30,66% 15,75% 15,24% 100,00%
Percentages of the total by event (% by column)
18 - 34 29,50% 29,48% 28,25% 34,93% 31,69% 31,58% 36,64% 39,02% 50,81% 50,88% 42,98%
35 - 44 16,95% 15,88% 15,68% 15,12% 16,19% 18,60% 19,66% 20,66% 24,66% 24,79% 20,00%
45 - 59 23,74% 23,74% 24,00% 21,85% 24,02% 22,46% 21,45% 21,02% 19,67% 19,54% 20,08%
60 - 70 16,64% 17,13% 17,73% 14,69% 16,48% 17,54% 13,59% 12,29% 3,91% 3,87% 10,43%
71 - > 13,17% 13,76% 14,34% 13,40% 11,62% 9,82% 8,67% 7,02% 0,95% 0,93% 6,50%
TOTAL 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%